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Management of transboundary river basins—or, for that
matter, any transboundary natural system—is a notoriously difficult
problem. Typically, political and legal authority is divided along
geographic lines that do not map well onto the boundaries of
natural systems, so that transboundary cooperation and
coordination are needed to manage the resource effectively. In
many cases, however, the transboundary natural system affects only
a portion of each nation-state it straddles and thus may be
perceived at the national level as a regional-level (and therefore
lower priority) concern. This invites a certain level of indifference
or even neglect at the level of nation-states—traditionally, the
exclusive authors and subjects of public international law, which in
its pure Westphalian form is said to consist of legal obligations
1
owed by sovereign states to other sovereign states.
†
Professor and Henry J. Fletcher Chair, University of Minnesota Law
School.
1. In a classic definition, J.L. Brierly stated that international law is “the
body of rules and principles of action which are binding upon civilized states in
their relations with one another.” J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE 1 (Sir Humphrey Waldock
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That, in a nutshell, has been the historic pattern in North
America’s Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Basin.
Straddling the
boundary between the United States and Canada, the Great Lakes
are arguably the world’s most important freshwater system,
comprising approximately twenty percent of the planet’s fresh
2
surface water. The Great Lakes are also a priceless economic,
aesthetic, recreational, cultural, and ecological asset. In 1909, the
United States and Great Britain (on behalf of Canada) undertook
to manage the Great Lakes and other transboundary waterways
3
through the Boundary Waters Treaty.
Subsequent ancillary
agreements included a series of Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreements.
Yet despite these promising vehicles for
transboundary cooperation, management of the Great Lakes has
rarely been seen as a pressing national concern in either the
4
United States or Canada. For their part, the eight U.S. states and
5
two Canadian provinces that lie wholly or in part within the Great
Lakes-St. Lawrence Basin individually lack the capacity to manage
the lakes and the St. Lawrence River effectively without
cooperation of all the others. Collectively, because they are not
sovereign nation-states for purposes of international law and
because their respective federal constitutions vest the foreign affairs
6
power at the federal level, these subnational governments lack the
legal authority to enter into binding transboundary agreements
among themselves. What is needed, then, is some alternative
coordinating mechanism—one that, unlike international law, does
not depend on legally binding agreements between sovereign
ed., 6th ed. 1963). On this view, it was “widely agreed that states were the singular
subjects of international law, with other actors existing only as objects of the law,
interacting with the international legal system but only indirectly through their
national governments.” Lauren Groth, Transforming Accountability: A Proposal for
Reconsidering How Human Rights Obligations Are Applied to Private Military Security
Firms, 35 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 29, 49 (2012).
2. See GOV’T OF CANADA & U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE GREAT LAKES: AN
ENVIRONMENTAL ATLAS AND RESOURCE BOOK 3 (3d ed. 1995), available at
http://www.epa.gov/glnpo/atlas/index.html.
3. Treaty Between the United States and Great Britain Relating to Boundary
Waters, and Questions Arising Between the United States and Canada, U.S.-Gr.
Brit., Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448 [hereinafter Boundary Waters Treaty].
4. Minnesota, Wisconsin, Michigan, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
and New York.
5. Ontario and Quebec.
6. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall enter into any Treaty,
Alliance, or Confederation . . . .”); id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall have
Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties . . . .”).
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nation-states, yet carries sufficient normative weight to actually
influence and constrain the actions of subnational governments (in
the case of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence system, eight U.S. states
and two Canadian provinces).
This article argues that the recently adopted Great Lakes
7
8
Water Resources Compact and Agreement represent just such a
subnational but transboundary coordinating mechanism. The
substantive aims of the Compact and Agreement are relatively
modest: they seek to curb or prevent large-scale exports of fresh
9
water out of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence basin. More important
than the substantive goals, however, are the mechanisms by which
these shared policy goals are to be implemented and enforced.
The Compact is a legally binding agreement among the eight U.S.
basin states, duly authorized by Congress as required by the U.S.
10
Constitution.
It requires its member states to adopt and
implement enforceable processes, measures, and substantive
commitments to manage Great Lakes Basin water withdrawals and
11
diversions in accordance with standards set out in the Compact;
further, it establishes a regional coordinating body made up of
representatives of the member states to make decisions of regionwide scope or impact and to review the member states’ compliance
12
with the Compact.
The Agreement is a parallel, non-binding,
7. Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact, Pub. L.
No. 110-342, 122 Stat. 3739 (2008) [hereinafter Compact].
8. Great Lakes-Saint Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water Resources
Agreement, Dec. 13, 2005 [hereinafter Agreement], available at http://www
.cglg.org/projects/water/docs/12-13-05/Great_Lakes-St_Lawrence_River_Basin
_Sustainable_Water_Resources_Agreement.pdf.
9. See generally Jessica A. Bielecki, Managing Resources with Interstate Compacts:
A Perspective from the Great Lakes, 14 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 173 (2007) (recounting the
legal and policy context and negotiating history of the Great Lakes Compact and
Agreement).
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (“No State shall, without the Consent of
Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State . . . .”).
11. See, e.g., Compact, supra note 7, § 4.3(3) (“No Party may approve a
Proposal [for a new or increased withdrawal, consumptive use, or diversion] if the
Party determines that the Proposal is inconsistent with this Compact or the
Standard of Review and Decision or any implementing rules or regulations
promulgated thereunder.”); id. § 4.11 (establishing a decision-making standard
setting forth criteria for approval of withdrawals and consumptive uses, including,
inter alia, requirements that return flows go to the watershed of origin; that there
are no significant individual or cumulative adverse effects to water quality or
quantity; that implementation incorporates environmentally sound and
economically feasible water conservation measures; and that the proposed
withdrawal or consumptive use is reasonable).
12. See id. §§ 2.1–.2 (establishing a Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin
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good-faith agreement that extends identical requirements to the
Canadian provinces of Ontario and Quebec, and establishes a
Regional Body of which the eight states and two provinces are all
13
members.
Although the Agreement is legally non-binding
(because U.S. states and Canadian provinces may not make
international law), it is considered morally obligatory; and the eight
U.S. states are already, in effect, legally bound to its substantive
provisions insofar as they are identical to those in the legally
binding Compact.
The Compact, then, should ensure the
cooperation and compliance of eight of the ten parties, thereby
creating an incentive for Ontario and Quebec also to cooperate
and comply, secure in the knowledge that there should be no
defectors among the more numerous parties on the U.S. side of the
border. Moreover, because each of the states and provinces has
adopted implementing legislation to give effect to the
14
commitments set out in the Compact and Agreement, even the
provinces have in a sense bound themselves. It is in that sense that
the Compact and Agreement create a unique kind of
transboundary normativity, even in the absence of public
international law.
Part I of this article will briefly describe the Great LakesSt. Lawrence ecosystem and the environmental and natural
resource management challenges it entails, as well as the principal
institutions that have evolved to attempt to address those
challenges. Part II will describe the Great Lakes Water Resources
Compact and the Great Lakes Sustainable Water Resources
Agreement, discuss the impetus for the development of these
instruments, and assess their significance for transboundary
coordination in the Great Lakes Basin. Part III will explore the
implications of these developments for transboundary coordination

Water Resources Council consisting of the governors of the states party to the
Compact and defining its powers and duties); id. § 3.4(2) (authorizing the Council
to review the water management and conservation programs and policies of the
parties); id. § 4.5(1)(f) (providing for regional review of “regionally significant or
potentially precedent-setting” proposals for withdrawals or consumptive uses).
13. See Agreement, supra note 8, art. 400(1)–(2) (establishing a Regional
Body “composed of the Governor or Premier of each of the Parties, or a person
designated by each of them”).
14. See Projects: Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact
Implementation, COUNCIL GREAT LAKES GOVERNORS, http://www.cglg.org
/projects/water/CompactImplementation.asp (last updated Feb. 17, 2011)
(providing a link to implementing state legislation).
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in the Great Lakes and in other transboundary natural resource
management contexts.
I.

THE GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE BASIN
AND ITS MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES

The Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Basin spans a vast area in the
heart of the North American continent. Comprising five of the
world’s twelve largest continental lakes by area, including three of
15
the four largest, plus North America’s second largest river by
16
discharge, the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence system is one of the
world’s mightiest and most important freshwater systems. The
Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Basin is also home to six of the United
States’ fifty-one largest metropolitan areas and eleven of Canada’s
twenty largest population centers, including its two largest, Toronto
and Montreal. The volume of water in the lakes constitutes
approximately 20% of the world’s fresh surface water and 95% of
17
the fresh surface water in the forty-eight contiguous states. But
they are more than a reservoir of freshwater for human
consumption. The Great Lakes are also an extraordinary scenic,
aesthetic, recreational, commercial, and ecological resource, a true
“inland sea” extending deep into the industrial and agricultural
heartlands of both the United States and Canada, a region of some
18
forty million people.

15. Lake Superior is the largest of the Great Lakes and the world’s second
largest lake, Lake Huron is the world’s fourth largest, and Lake Michigan is fifth.
Lake Erie is thirteenth, and Lake Ontario is seventeenth. About Our Great Lakes:
Lake by Lake Profiles, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN.: GREAT LAKES ENVTL.
RES. LABORATORY, http://www.glerl.noaa.gov/pr/ourlakes/lakes.html (last visited
January 25, 2013). The Caspian Sea is considerably larger than Lake Superior, but
geologically it is considered a small ocean, an isolated remnant of the much larger
global ocean of which it was once a contiguous part.
16. The Mississippi-Missouri River discharges about fifty percent more water
into the Gulf of Mexico than the St. Lawrence discharges into the North Atlantic.
See FIELD GUIDE TO RIVERS OF NORTH AMERICA 3 tbl.1 (Arthur C. Behnke & Colbert
E. Cushing eds., 2010) (listing the Mississippi as the largest North American river
by discharge at 18,400 cubic meters per second and the St. Lawrence second at
12,600 cubic meters per second).
17. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-515, GREAT LAKES: AN
OVERALL STRATEGY AND INDICATORS FOR MEASURING PROGRESS ARE NEEDED TO
BETTER ACHIEVE RESTORATION GOALS 11 (2003).
18. See id. at 38; Susan H. MacKenzie, Toward Integrated Resource Management:
Lessons About the Ecosystem Approach from the Laurentian Great Lakes, 21 ENVTL. MGMT.
173, 174 (1997).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2013

5

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 17

1002

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:3

Yet the Great Lakes are also a deeply stressed and a deeply
challenged resource. Lake Erie was famously written off as “dead”
in the 1960s and early 1970s, the victim of eutrophication so severe
19
that it was choking off aquatic life. Many believed it would never
recover, and Lake Michigan and Lake Ontario were thought to be
20
headed down the same path. Strong measures to clean up the
largest pollution inputs—municipal sewage and industrial
outfalls—have led to marked improvements in water quality and
partial restoration of fish populations. The Lakes nonetheless
remain highly stressed by excessive nutrient loads; festering toxic
“hotspots” in harbors and near-historic industrial outfalls; and
biological pollution in the form of invasive exotic species carried in
with ships’ ballast water or infiltrating through rivers and canals,
displacing native species and disrupting the food webs and
21
ecological relationships that define aquatic life in the Great Lakes.
Together, the United States and Canada have put in place
some institutions and some important agreements, beginning with
22
the Boundary Waters Treaty, which committed the parties to
observe freedom of navigation and commerce in the Great Lakes
23
and other boundary waters; to regulate obstructions, diversions,
24
and artificial elevations or diminutions of natural lake levels; and
25
to resolve management questions and disputes amicably. Toward
19. RICHARD N.L. ANDREWS, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT, MANAGING
OURSELVES: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 224, 415 n.36 (1999)
(attributing the statement to biologist and environmental advocate Barry
Commoner and stating that it was widely cited in the popular media in the late
1960s); DAVE DEMPSEY, ON THE BRINK: THE GREAT LAKES IN THE 21ST CENTURY 113–
15 (2004) [hereinafter DEMPSEY, ON THE BRINK]; DAVE DEMPSEY, RUIN & RECOVERY:
MICHIGAN’S RISE AS A CONSERVATION LEADER 248 (2001) [hereinafter DEMPSEY, RUIN
& RECOVERY] (stating that Life magazine declared Lake Erie “dead” in the 1960s).
20. See DEMPSEY, RUIN & RECOVERY, supra note 19, at 249 (stating that
Newsweek magazine announced a “death watch” for Lake Michigan in 1967).
21. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Managing Transboundary Aquatic Ecosystems:
Lessons from the Great Lakes, 19 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 209, 215–18
(2006) and sources cited therein (cataloging environmental problems in the Great
Lakes).
22. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 3.
23. Id. art. I.
24. Id. art. III (prohibiting uses, obstructions, or diversions that alter natural
levels except as authorized by the International Joint Commission).
25. See id. pmbl. (stating that the parties are “equally desirous to prevent
disputes regarding the use of boundary waters and to settle all questions which are
now pending between the United States and the Dominion of Canada involving
the rights, obligations, or interests of either in relation to the other or to the
inhabitants of the other, along their common frontier, and to make provision for
the adjustment and settlement of all such questions as may hereafter arise”).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol39/iss3/17

6

Karkkainen: The Great Lakes Water Resources Compact and Agreement: Transbound

2013]

THE GREAT LAKES COMPACT AND AGREEMENT

1003

that end, the Treaty established the International Joint
26
a remarkable binational institution
Commission (IJC),
empowered to make regulatory decisions over certain proposed
27
actions affecting the boundary waters, to investigate and make
recommendations to the governments on questions they refer to it
28
29
(“references”), and to arbitrate disputes.
The Boundary Waters Treaty is a prime example of public
international law in its classical Westphalian sense: a contractual
undertaking freely entered by autonomous and, in principle, equal
national sovereigns, setting forth a series of mutual inter-sovereign
obligations. Perhaps the most striking innovation in the Boundary
Waters Treaty, however, was the creation of a genuinely binational
institution, the IJC, to act as an independent and impartial
umpire—not merely a political or diplomatic forum for the
principals to negotiate, but within its areas of jurisdiction, an
independent decision maker in its own right, as well as an
30
independent adviser to the governments. Creation of the IJC was
a bold and visionary step. Sovereign nations are typically loath to
surrender actual decision-making authority to anyone, let alone an
independent binational (or multi-national) commission, and few
sovereigns are more reluctant on this score than the United States.
The Boundary Waters Treaty is widely celebrated for
establishing the IJC. Less widely appreciated is that the Boundary
Waters Treaty was one of the world’s first treaties to squarely

26. Id. art. VII (creating the IJC composed of six members, three appointed
by the President of the United States and three appointed by the British Crown on
the recommendation of the Governor in Council of Canada).
27. Id. art. VIII (authorizing the IJC to regulate uses, obstructions, and
diversions, and setting out a priority of uses to be followed by the IJC).
28. Id. art. IX (committing the Parties to refer “questions or matters of
difference arising between them” to the IJC, which is empowered to “examine into
and report upon the facts and circumstances of the particular questions and
matters referred, together with such conclusions and recommendations as may be
appropriate”).
29. Id. art. X (providing that by mutual consent the Parties may refer “[a]ny
questions or matters of difference” to the IJC “for decision” by majority vote of the
Commission).
30. The six IJC Commissioners are appointed by the national governments,
three per side, but by tradition Commissioners exercise independent judgment on
behalf of the Commission and not as representatives of their respective
governments. See LEE BOTTS & PAUL MULDOON, EVOLUTION OF THE GREAT LAKES
WATER QUALITY AGREEMENT 11–13 (2006) (describing the Commissioners’
tradition of independent, objective judgment not beholden to nationalistic
concerns); DEMPSEY, ON THE BRINK, supra note 19, at 244–45.
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31

address transboundary pollution, and thus it represents a major
precursor to modern international environmental law. Tucked
into Article IV of the Treaty is this simple yet sweeping
commitment: “It is further agreed that the waters herein defined as
boundary waters and waters flowing across the boundary shall not
be polluted on either side to the injury of health or property on the
32
other.”
With that simple bilateral commitment, the United States and
Canada embraced a mutual obligation to prevent significant harm
by transboundary pollution—the first clear expression in treaty law
of the great principle of state responsibility to prevent serious
transboundary environmental harm. That principle would later
33
find embodiment in the celebrated Trail Smelter arbitration, which
in turn would lend its name to the Trail Smelter principle, widely
considered a cornerstone of the customary international law of the
34
environment.
Notwithstanding the brave words and bold vision of the
Boundary Waters Treaty, however, transboundary pollution control
remained a minor concern of the governments of the United States
and Canada throughout the early decades of the twentieth century.
An exhaustive IJC investigation of waterborne diseases, begun in
31. See Edith Brown Weiss, International Environmental Law: Contemporary Issues
and the Emergence of a New World Order, 81 GEO. L.J. 675, 675 (1993) (describing the
pollution provision of the Boundary Waters Treaty as a “dramatic exception” to
the typical treaties of its day which addressed water allocation, navigation, and
fishing to the exclusion of environmental concerns); see also Ludwik A. Teclaff &
Eileen Teclaff, International Control of Cross-Media Pollution—An Ecosystem Approach,
27 NAT. RESOURCES J. 21, 24 & nn.13–14 (1987) (discussing the 1909 Boundary
Waters Treaty and the 1904 Franco-Swiss Convention for the Regulation of Fishing
of Frontier Waters as early bilateral agreements addressing transboundary
pollution).
32. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 3, art. IV.
33. Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1941). The Trail
Smelter case involved damage to crops, orchards, and forests in the State of
Washington from sulfur oxide fumes emanating from a Canadian lead and zinc
smelter. The arbitral tribunal held that “no State has the right to use or permit
the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the
territory of another or the properties or persons therein, when the case is of
serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing
evidence.” Id. at 1965.
34. See, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt, Green War: An Assessment of the Environmental
Law of International Armed Conflict, 22 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 44–45 (1997) (describing
“the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas—use your property in such a manner
so as not to injure another” as “the most basic and widely accepted traditional
principle” of customary international environmental law and the basis for the
decision in the Trail Smelter case).
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1912 on a reference from the governments, ended in sweeping IJC
recommendations for pollution control measures in 1918, but
these recommendations were never acted upon by the
35
governments.
When the Treaty finally did prompt some action in the latter
half of the twentieth century, however, its impact was great. In
response to a 1946 reference, a 1950 IJC report recommended
“urgent action” to address rising pollution levels in the St. Mary’s,
36
St. Clair, Detroit, and Niagara Rivers and in Lake St. Clair. The
IJC report led to the adoption of significant monitoring and
37
pollution abatement measures on both sides of the border,
measures that have been called “the first of their kind on an
38
international basis.”
One commentator has argued that these
early water quality standards were the main progenitors of what
became the principal pollution abatement programs of both the
39
United States and Canada. If that analysis is correct, then the
seemingly modest and long-ignored little pollution control
provision in the Boundary Waters Treaty might be seen as a
progenitor of nothing less than the Clean Water Act on the one
hand, and modern international environmental law on the other.
But perhaps the greatest contribution of the Boundary
Waters Treaty to the development of environmental law
came through its direct progeny, the Great Lakes Water
40
Quality
Agreement
(GLWQA),
first
adopted
in
35. See DEMPSEY, ON THE BRINK, supra note 19, at 98–99.
36. BOTTS & MULDOON, supra note 30, at 13.
37. Id.
38. Id.; see also Don Munton, Dependence and Interdependence in Transboundary
Environmental Relations, 36 INT’L J. 139, 159 (1980–81) (stating that the Great Lakes
Water Quality Agreement “represented both a significant innovation in the
bilateral relationship” between the U.S. and Canada and “a unique achievement in
international politics” insofar as it created a joint board to coordinate national
pollution control programs and to monitor and report independently on the
condition of the aquatic resource).
39. Don Munton, Great Lakes Water Quality: A Study in Environmental Politics
and Diplomacy, in RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT: POLICY PERSPECTIVES FOR
CANADA 153, 155 (O.P. Dwivedi ed., 1980).
40. Agreement on Great Lakes Water Quality, U.S.-Can., Apr. 15, 1972, 23
U.S.T. 301 [hereinafter GLWQA]. The 1972 agreement was superseded by a
subsequent instrument, the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1978, done
at Ottawa on November 22, 1978, which in turn was amended on October 16,
1983, and November 18, 1987. See infra notes 59, 66 and accompanying text. The
most recent iteration is the Great Lakes Water Quality Protocol of 2012, signed by
the United States and Canada in Washington on September 7, 2012, which
amends the 1978 Agreement, as amended. See infra note 70 and accompanying
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1972 and amended at intervals in subsequent years. For both the
United States and Canada, the GLWQA represented their first
major foray into modern international environmental law. There
had, of course, been bilateral, regional, and multilateral
43
agreements on wildlife and other natural resources prior to 1972,
and in limited ways, pollution control had also begun to creep into
international law well before the 1970s—for example, through the
Trail Smelter arbitration and the pollution control provision of the
Boundary Waters Treaty itself. But the GLWQA was a new breed of
agreement—a binational agreement dedicated exclusively to
44
pollution control in a transboundary setting.
At first, the GLWQA was understood as simply a subsidiary
agreement in furtherance of the Boundary Waters Treaty’s
Article IV pollution control provision. Under that provision, in
1964 the IJC undertook a reference on pollution in Lake Erie—an
issue of rising public concern in the wake of visible, rapidly
45
worsening, and widely publicized eutrophication. While the IJC
investigation was ongoing, the public’s attention was riveted by
Great Lakes beach closures, a fire that broke out on Cleveland’s
Cuyahoga River, and a massive alewife die-off in Lake Michigan, as
well as reports of plans for oil drilling on the bed of Lake Erie
surfacing shortly after the disastrous 1969 oil spill in California’s
Santa Barbara Channel, perhaps the first major environmental
46
disaster to be viewed by millions on television.
The IJC assembled panels of experts, investigated, held public
text.
41. BOTTS & MULDOON, supra note 30, at 1.
42. The Agreement was amended in 1978 and a Protocol was attached in
1987. Id. at 51, 89.
43. See, e.g., Convention Between the United States and Great Britain (for
Canada) for the Protection of Migratory Birds, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Aug. 16, 1916, 39
Stat. 1702.
44. A handful of earlier agreements, all of them European, had tackled
transboundary water pollution in regional settings, but the earlier agreements
were generally limited to setting up institutions to arrange for research, conduct
fact-finding, and make advisory recommendations to governments. See C.B.
Bourne, International Law and Pollution of International Rivers and Lakes, 6 U. BRIT.
COLUM. L. REV. 115, 131–32 (1971). For example, the International Commission
for Protection of the Rhine was established by treaty in 1950 to arrange for
research into Rhine pollution and to make recommendations to Rhine basin
governments, but specific pollution control objectives were not specified for the
Rhine by international agreement until 1976. PATRICIA BIRNIE & ALAN BOYLE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE ENVIRONMENT 243 (2d ed. 2002).
45. See DEMPSEY, ON THE BRINK, supra note 19, at 123–25.
46. See BOTTS & MULDOON, supra note 30, at 14.
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hearings, and issued its final report on Lake Erie eutrophication in
1970, urging new and more detailed water quality objectives and
47
pollution control measures. Acknowledging that existing levels of
pollution were incompatible with their commitments under the
Boundary Waters Treaty, the governments convened a working
group that negotiated the first GLWQA, completing its work in
48
1972.
As a formal matter, the GLWQA was and remains an executive
agreement implementing Article IV of the Boundary Waters
49
Treaty. But it has also taken on a life of its own as our oldest, and
in some ways most durable, international environmental
agreement. Its initial goal was narrowly conceived: to restore and
enhance “water quality in the Great Lakes system” by establishing
water quality standards for nutrients; toxic substances; materials
that produce colors, odors, or other nuisance-like effects; “floating
debris, oil, scum and other floating materials”; and “substances
that . . . settle to form putrescent or otherwise objectionable sludge
50
deposits.” But the principal focus of pollution control efforts was
on phosphorus, which had been identified as the main culprit in
51
The GLWQA was originally
Lake Erie eutrophication.
understood, then, as a simple pollution control agreement,
motivated principally by a concern about phosphorus, the
dominant pollution threat in the Great Lakes of the 1960s and
1970s and still a critically important one, but only one in what is
now understood to be a much broader suite of stressors on the
aquatic environment of the Great Lakes.
It quickly became apparent, however, that the 1972 GLWQA
was too narrowly drawn. Phosphorus pollution in Lake Erie was
reduced quickly and sharply with the construction of modern
sewage treatment plants and the adoption of limitations on the use
of phosphates in detergents, but the environmental problems
confronting the Great Lakes turned out to be both more numerous

47. Id.
48. Id. at 15.
49. See GLWQA, supra note 40, art. VI (stating that the IJC “shall assist in the
implementation” of the GLWQA and specifying the IJC’s implementation
responsibilities pursuant to Article IX of the Boundary Waters Treaty); id. art. XI
(“Nothing in this Agreement shall be deemed to diminish the rights and
obligations of the Parties as set forth in the Boundary Waters Treaty.”).
50. Id. pmbl. & art. II.
51. BOTTS & MULDOON, supra note 30, at 27.
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and more complex than the original GLWQA had contemplated.
Research conducted in the 1970s pointed to new problems—
concentrated “hotspots” of toxic contaminants in ports and at
industrial outfalls, the buildup of bioaccumulative toxins in the
flesh of fish and other aquatic life, airborne deposition of
pollutants, and the contributions of nonpoint pollution sources
along the shores of the Great Lakes and far inland along their
53
tributaries.
The 1972 Agreement had also set in motion processes that
mounted pressure for change.
By the terms of the 1972
Agreement, the IJC was to report periodically on progress toward
the
Agreement’s
water
quality
objectives
and
make
54
recommendations to the governments.
This built on the IJC’s
role as independent and impartial adviser to the governments, but
at the same time partially transformed the IJC into an independent
“watchdog” accountability mechanism in the pollution control
arena. The original Agreement also committed the governments to
undertake a five-year review of the Agreement’s effectiveness with
55
an eye toward making such revisions as would be necessary —thus
setting in motion a dynamic, iterative, rolling review and revision
process, not only of the Agreement’s overall goals and objectives
but also of the management approaches and institutional
arrangements that might be necessary to achieve environmental
improvements. Finally, among the institutional arrangements that
emerged out of the 1972 Agreement were several that dramatically
56
opened the process to citizen participation.
In 1978, the governments adopted an amended GLWQA,
52. See id. at 52–57 (stating that scientists identified PCBs and other
bioaccumulative toxic pollutants, nonpoint source pollution, airborne deposition
of pollutants, and other threats to the Great Lakes ecosystem).
53. See id. at 54–58.
54. GLWQA, supra note 40, art. VI, § 3 (mandating that the IJC report to the
Parties and governments on progress toward meeting water quality objectives and
effectiveness of programs and measures, and offer its recommendations); id.
art. IX, § 1 (mandating that the Parties consult on IJC reports and
recommendations submitted under Article VI, section 3, and that they consider
modifications of water quality objectives, programs and measures, and the
Agreement, as appropriate).
55. Id. art. IX, § 3 (mandating that the Parties conduct a “comprehensive
review” of the Agreement during its fifth year in force).
56. See BOTTS & MULDOON, supra note 30, at 39–44 (describing the
emergence of environmental organizations, coupled with enhanced opportunities
for public participation in proceedings of the IJC and other Great Lakes
institutions).
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going beyond the 1972 Agreement both in the scope and nature of
the problems to be addressed and in the means to be used to
57
address them. At the urging of the IJC’s Great Lakes Research
Advisory Board, the 1978 Agreement introduced the concept of an
58
ecosystem approach to management, with the ambitious aim to
“restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the waters of the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem,” as well
59
as to “eliminate [toxic] pollutants.” This was the first time an
international agreement of any kind had embraced an “ecosystem
approach” and such a sweeping, multi-faceted ecological
60
restoration goal —although some commentators have suggested
the implications of this language may not have been fully
appreciated by all participants in the negotiating sessions that led
61
to the adoption of the 1978 Agreement.
The ecosystem approach articulated in the 1978 amendments
to the GLWQA would later be emulated in subsequent natural
62
resource management regimes elsewhere in the United States and
63
64
65
Canada, internationally, and globally. Once again, the Great
57. See id. at 51–52 (stating that the 1978 Agreement embraced new goals,
including an “ecosystem approach” and “virtual elimination” of toxic pollutants);
id. at 66–69 (stating that the adoption of an ecosystem approach and the goal of
virtual elimination of toxics necessitated a broadening of management efforts to
address non-chemical stressors, tributary waters, land use impacts on ecosystem
health, contaminated sediments, and airborne deposition of pollutants).
58. See DEMPSEY, ON THE BRINK, supra note 19, at 188–91.
59. Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1978, U.S.-Can., art. II, Nov. 22,
1978, 30 U.S.T. 1383.
60. Ludwik A. Teclaff, Evolution of the River Basin Concept in National and
International Water Law, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 359, 378 & n.111, 379 (1996) (noting
that although the Stockholm Declaration called for audits of development projects
in “representative ecosystems of international significance,” the 1978 GLWQA was
the first instrument to call for an “ecosystem approach” to natural resource
management).
61. BOTTS & MULDOON, supra note 30, at 63.
62. See, e.g., CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM, http://www.chesapeakebay.net (last
visited Jan. 26, 2013); Everglades Restoration, FLA. DEPARTMENT ENVTL. PROTECTION,
http://www.dep.state.fl.us/secretary/everglades/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2013).
63. See, e.g., FISHERIES & OCEANS CAN., PACIFIC NORTH COAST INTEGRATED
MANAGEMENT AREA: AN ECOSYSTEM APPROACH 2–4, available at http://www.pac.dfo
-mpo.gc.ca/publications/pdfs/pncima-eng.pdf (describing an “integrated,
ecosystem approach” to managing British Columbia’s Queen Charlotte Basin in
the North Pacific, and stating that “[t]his is consistent with the Government of
Canada’s overall direction and with Fisheries and Oceans Canada’s new Wild
Salmon Policy”).
64. See, e.g., Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the
Baltic Sea Area, Apr. 9, 1992, art. III, subdiv. 1 (entered into force Jan. 17, 2000),
available at http://www.helcom.fi/Convention/en_GB/text/ (stating an
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Lakes regime spawned by the Boundary Waters Treaty proved to be
an innovator and pacesetter for the world community.
The broad ecosystem restoration goals enunciated in the
revised 1978 Agreement were largely kept intact when a new 1987
66
Protocol was negotiated, and these goals remain foundational to
the Great Lakes management regime today. But the 1987 Protocol
added several important wrinkles. First, in recognition of the
important role of airborne deposition of pollutants, air pollution
67
control was explicitly added to the Agreement’s list of objectives.
Second, while maintaining overall basin-wide ecosystem restoration
goals, the parties committed to develop Remedial Action Plans for
identified “areas of concern” (toxic hotspots) throughout the Great
Lakes Basin and launched a process to develop management plans
68
The 1987 Protocol thus
at the level of the individual lakes.
incorporated an innovative “nested” management scheme at
multiple interconnected scales, another important innovation and
one more significant evolutionary step in the iterative unfolding of
69
Great Lakes governance.
A recently adopted 2012 Protocol makes additional
70
It expressly recognizes aquatic invasive species,
commitments.
discharges from ships, climate change, and habitat and species loss

overarching goal to “promote the ecological restoration of the Baltic Sea Area and
the preservation of its ecological balance”).
65. See, e.g., Teclaff, supra note 60.
66. Protocol Amending the 1978 Agreement Between the United States and
Canada on Great Lakes Water Quality, as Amended on October 16, 1983, U.S.Can., Nov. 18, 1987, T.I.A.S. No. 11,551 [hereinafter 1987 Protocol].
67. Id. art. XIX (adding a new Annex 15 to commit the Parties to research,
surveillance, monitoring, and control measures on airborne toxic pollutants).
68. Id. art. VIII (amending Annex 2 to commit the Parties to undertake
Remedial Action Plans for designated Areas of Concern and to develop and
implement Lakewide Management Plans for each of the Great Lakes).
69. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY: GREAT LAKES NAT’L PROGRAM OFFICE, GREAT
LAKES ECOSYSTEM REPORT 2000, at E-1 (2001) (describing the Great Lakes Program
as a “nested structure . . . meant to parallel the natural boundaries found in the
Great Lakes ecosystem: from local landscapes to sub-watersheds, to individual lake
basins, to the entire Great Lakes Basin”); Henry A. Regier, Great Lakes-St. Lawrence
River Basin Assessments: Case Study, in BIOREGIONAL ASSESSMENTS: SCIENCE AT THE
CROSSROADS OF MANAGEMENT AND POLICY 135, 138 (K. Norman Johnson et al. eds.,
1999) (“[T]he bioregional assessment process has self-organized into an implicit
three-level holarchy.”).
70. Protocol Amending the Agreement Between Canada and the United
States of America on Great Lakes Water Quality, 1978, as Amended on October
16, 1983 and on November 18, 1987, U.S.-Can., Sept. 7, 2012 [hereinafter 2012
Protocol].
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71

as priority concerns and places special emphasis on restoration
and maintenance of nearshore areas, where stressors tend to be
72
greatest. The governments pledge to adopt common objectives,
to implement cooperative programs, and to involve key subnational
actors including states, provinces, municipalities, Tribal
Governments, First Nations, watershed management agencies, and
73
the public in Great Lakes management and restoration.
The
parties promise heightened transparency and accountability
through adoption of specific objectives for each lake and at basin74
wide scales, coupled with enhanced monitoring and reporting
75
They pledge to use an adaptive management
requirements.
76
approach. The 2012 Protocol contemplates an enhanced role for

71. See id. app., pmbl., cl. 4 (“[e]mphasizing the need to strengthen efforts to
address new and continuing threats . . . , including aquatic invasive species,
nutrients, chemical substances, discharge from vessels, the climate change
impacts, and the loss of habitats and species”); see also id. annex 5 (discharges from
vessels); id. annex 6 (aquatic invasive species); id. annex 7 (habitat and species);
id. annex 8 (groundwater); id. annex 9 (climate change impacts).
72. Id. app., pmbl., cl. 7 (“[r]ecognizing that nearshore areas must be
restored and protected because they are the major source of drinking water for
communities within the basin, are where most human commerce and recreation
occurs, and are the critical ecological link between watersheds and the open
waters of the Great Lakes”).
73. Id. app., art. 3, § 1(a) (adopting common General Objectives); id. app.,
art. 3, § 1(b) (committing the parties to consult and cooperate with state and
provincial governments, tribes, First Nations, Métis, municipal governments,
watershed management agencies, other local public agencies, downstream
jurisdictions, and the public to identify and work to attain Specific Objectives,
including lake ecosystem objectives and substance objectives); id. app., art. 4
(committing the parties to develop and adopt implementation programs and
measures in cooperation and consultation with the same various persons and
institutions).
74. Id. app., art. 3, § 1(b)(i)(A) (committing to the establishment of
binational lake ecosystem objectives, except for Lake Michigan which lies wholly
within the United States); id. app., art. 3, § 1(b)(ii) (committing to the
establishment of basinwide substance objectives).
75. Id. app., art. 3, § 3 (monitoring); id. app., art. 3, § 4 (reporting). The
various annexes also include issue-specific monitoring and reporting
requirements. See, e.g., id. app., annex 4(E)–(F) (establishing monitoring and
reporting requirements for nutrients); id. app., annex 6(B)–(D) (establishing
monitoring, surveillance, assessment, and reporting requirements for aquatic
invasive species).
76. Id. app., art. 2, § 4(b) (committing the parties to be “guided by”
principles of adaptive management, “implementing a systematic process by which
the Parties assess effectiveness of actions and adjust future actions to achieve the
objectives of this Agreement, as outcomes and ecosystem processes become better
understood”).
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77

the International Joint Commission and its subsidiary bodies,
including the Great Lakes Water Quality Board, Great Lakes
78
Science Advisory Board, and Great Lakes Regional Office, though
the IJC’s role remains largely one of information gathering and
advising. Indeed, the 2012 Protocol underscores that operational
responsibility for implementation of all these commitments
remains the sole responsibility of the national governments; both
the IJC and subnational actors are relegated to an advisory and
79
consultative role.
Without question, the Boundary Waters Treaty and its
progeny, the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, have been
profoundly influential, both within the Great Lakes Basin and
beyond. They serve as cornerstones of the larger U.S.-Canadian
relationship, and time and again they have served as early
prototypes and innovative models for what have become widely
adopted principles and approaches embraced in both national and
international law. They represent, in important ways, the best that
international law, and especially international environmental law,
has achieved.
And yet there is a certain irony to that characterization. For at
the end of the day, even the most enthusiastic proponents of these
arrangements concede that, in practice, they have often fallen
short of their lofty ambitions. As innovative and visionary as the
GLWQA has been—and as much as it has inspired its own imitators
elsewhere—it has largely been a failure if measured by its concrete
achievements since its early success in reducing phosphorus levels.
The Great Lakes are still under enormous stress, and progress
toward addressing those stressors has been in most areas painfully
77. Id. app., art. 7, § 1(a)–(o) (assigning IJC responsibilities for, inter alia,
analyzing and disseminating data and information, tendering advice and
recommendations to the parties, providing assistance to the parties as requested in
coordinating their joint activities, assisting in and advising on scientific matters,
investigating subjects referred to it by the parties, consulting with the public, and
raising public awareness).
78. Id. app., art. 8 (calling on the IJC to create a Great Lakes Water Quality
Board, a Great Lakes Science Advisory Board, and a Great Lakes Regional Office,
and defining the responsibilities of each body).
79. See id. app., art. 3, § 2 (“The Parties shall progress toward the attainment
of these General Objectives, Lake Ecosystem Objectives and Substance Objectives
through their respective domestic programs.”); id. app., art. 4, § 1 (“The Parties, in
cooperation and consultation with State and Provincial Governments, Tribal
Governments, First Nations, Métis, Municipal Governments, watershed
management agencies, other local public agencies, and the Public, shall develop
and implement programs and other measures . . . .” (emphasis added)).
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slow, or even nonexistent.
Some have argued that the governments of the United States
and Canada made a strategic blunder—either that, or a shrewd but
cynical calculated choice—when they decided to leave
responsibility for implementing the GLWQA entirely in their own
hands, declining to give the IJC or any other binational body
implementation and operational authority over environmental
80
matters. Instead, the IJC is left on the outside, with authority only
to observe, investigate, report, offer criticism and suggestions, and
jawbone as environmental problems in the Great Lakes Basin
continue to get short shrift and as commitments nominally
undertaken by the governments through the GLWQA go
unfulfilled. Arguably, had the governments vested authority in the
IJC to make binding decisions on implementation measures, we
might be farther down the road toward fulfilling the unmet
promises of the 1978 GLWQA and its 1987 Protocol.
An alternative hypothesis, equally plausible in my view, is that
the failure of the GLWQA to get traction on the daunting
environmental challenges of the Great Lakes reveals something
deeper about the limits of international environmental law as a tool
to address complex transboundary environmental and natural
resource management problems. That is to say, the situation in the
Great Lakes region might best be understood not as a simple
failure to implement ambitious bilateral agreements. Maybe the
more fundamental problem is that the nature of the instrument is
poorly matched to the nature of the challenges involved. The
suggestion here is that a contractual agreement between two
sovereign states is not the kind of instrument—and not the right
kind of institutional arrangement—that can actually do something
as complex and multidimensional as an “ecosystem approach to
management,” especially at this large, basin-wide, regional scale,
and most especially given the extraordinarily complex suite of
resources and stressors that comprise the system.
Perhaps the problem, in other words, is that international
environmental law itself—as conventionally and classically
understood, consisting of mutual contractual obligations freely
undertaken between national sovereigns—is inadequate to the task
80. See, e.g., Alisa Tschorke, Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement: Is Honesty
Without Accountability or Enforcement Still Enough?, 15 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV.
273, 287–99 (2008) (criticizing the GLWQA for failure to include public
accountability and enforcement measures).
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of managing as complex and multifaceted a transboundary
resource as the Great Lakes. On this view, the failure is not simply
a failure to implement or perform on a contract; instead, the
contractual approach itself is a flawed approach for the
undertaking.
If that is the case, then it is time to rethink the institutional
arrangements from the ground up. What is most striking about the
GLWQA, in its many iterations, is the mismatch between its bold
expression of intent to undertake an ecosystem approach and its
almost total inattention to questions of institutional design; i.e.,
how would we go about putting in place the ongoing institutional
arrangements that would be necessary to make an “ecosystem
approach to management” actually happen? It’s as if the drafters
of that instrument believed that simply getting the governments to
undertake a contractual commitment to an ecosystem approach
would create enough normative pressure to cause them to take the
hard follow-up steps of designing the institutional arrangements
that would make an ecosystem approach possible and then
executing that institutional design. But that is an effort the
governments have never even initiated in a serious way, despite the
passage of more than three decades since the words “ecosystem
approach” were first written into the contract.
A moment’s reflection would suggest that integrated
management of the entire suite of stressors and resources
implicated in a genuine ecosystem approach would require the
participation not only of the national governments but also of the
states and provinces, which bring supplemental and in some cases
unique capacities and competencies to the table, along with
intimate familiarity with environmental, social, economic, and legal
conditions in the Great Lakes Basin—and just possibly more
political will than the national governments, which tend to see the
Great Lakes as a regional and not a truly national concern, and
consequently of secondary or tertiary importance. Such an effort
would probably need to include some local public authorities as
well—major cities, port authorities, water and sewer districts,
watershed management agencies, and the like. It might need to
include some intergovernmental organizations—the IJC, as well as
the Great Lakes Fishery Commission, the Great Lakes Commission,
and the Council of Great Lakes Governors. It needs to include
tribal and First Nations authorities. It needs to find a way to
integrate input from leading scientists familiar with the Basin or
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whose work is directly relevant to the management challenges at
hand. To build legitimacy, transparency, and public support, it
probably needs to include leading non-governmental organizations
as well.
At some level, these groups already talk to one another, and all
are involved in one way or another with important aspects of Great
Lakes governance. But for all the hard work and good work that
has gone into the Great Lakes over the past four decades, precious
little has gone into actually thinking through the design of
governance institutions that would be capable of making an
ecosystem approach a reality, and not merely words on paper.
II. THE GREAT LAKES COMPACT AND AGREEMENT:
TRANSBOUNDARY NORMATIVITY WITHOUT INTERNATIONAL LAW?
Perhaps it is time to shift our focus away from thinking of
management of the Great Lakes as an inter-national problem
requiring an inter-national law solution—a binding contractual
agreement between sovereign nation states. That way of thinking
may be an obstacle to progress at this point. Instead, we might
think of it as a transboundary problem, requiring a new form of
effective transboundary governance, scaled to the resource we are
trying to manage and protect. In previous work I have labeled this
81
a “post-sovereign” approach —a provocative term, to be sure. But
by whatever label, the suggestion is that we need to look toward
building a transboundary hybrid “new governance” arrangement
tailored to the scope and nature of the resource, with the active
participation of all the groups identified in the closing paragraphs
of Part I of this article; not merely a sovereign-to-sovereign
arrangement, but an ongoing institutional arrangement embracing
subnational levels of government, as well as intergovernmental and
a variety of nongovernmental actors—the relevant elements of civil
society, if you will. These types of “new governance” arrangements
are actually becoming quite common in Europe and here and
there in the United States, and they have spawned a robust
82
literature of their own.
81. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Post-Sovereign Environmental Governance,
GLOBAL ENVTL. POL., Feb. 2004, at 72.
82. See, e.g., LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US (Gráinne de
Búrca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A
Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998); David M.
Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, Hard and Soft Law in the Construction of Social Europe:
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Such a hybrid new governance arrangement might prove
capable of making good on the promise of an ecosystem approach
in the Great Lakes Basin—or anywhere, for that matter. All the
elements for such an arrangement already exist in the Great Lakes
region; it’s just that, whether by inattention or by design, the parts
have never been assembled into a working whole.
The suggestion is not that this sort of institutional
arrangement is an easy thing to build; far from it. But many people
have been lulled into passivity by what has turned out to be the
false promise of the GLWQA that an ecosystem approach would be
implemented by the national governments.
And when the
governments have failed to deliver on that promise (for
understandable reasons, because they have never had the vision,
the blueprint, or, most importantly, the incentives to make it
actually happen), they have failed to hold each other accountable,
and no one else has stepped forward to take their place. Why?
Well, in part because key actors in the Great Lakes Basin continue
to accept the notion that management of the Great Lakes is
primarily a binational or international problem, something for the
national sovereigns to work out.
There are alternative models. Increasingly, the Europeans
appear willing to bracket the formalities of national sovereign
prerogative in the interest of devising pragmatic solutions to thorny
transboundary problems, including environmental and natural
resource management problems. They are doing it in the context
of managing the Baltic Sea, a large enclosed sea not unlike the
Great Lakes in many respects (apart from the fact that the Baltic is
saline). The management effort there got started a bit later than
with the Great Lakes but has far surpassed efforts in the Great
Lakes in the sophistication and functionality of its transboundary
institutional arrangements and in the progress it has made towards
achieving environmental improvement goals. The Europeans are
also increasingly proceeding down this path in the context of
transboundary integrated river basin management under the EU
Water Framework Directive. A prime example is the Danube River
basin, which traverses some eighteen nations from its source in
Germany’s Black Forest to its outlet at the Black Sea in Romania,
83
but is now managed under a joint management regime. In these
The Role of the Open Method of Co-ordination, 11 EUR. L.J. 343 (2005).
83. See Alistair S. Rieu-Clarke, An Overview of Stakeholder Participation—What
Current Practice and Future Challenges?, 18 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 611, 618–
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and other places, real transboundary “new governance” institutions
are being built, and they are achieving real results.
The Europeans have come to realize that these complex
problems cannot be addressed simply by treaty—that is, by intersovereign contracts and mutually binding obligations at a nation-tonation level. Treaties often continue to play a role in establishing
the institutional framework; the Helsinki Convention on the
84
Protection of the Baltic Sea and the Danube River Protection
85
Convention, for example, establish far-reaching substantive goals
and objectives, but they also create permanent regional institutions,
recognizing that the real work and the hard management decisions
need to take place closer to the ground, by people who are
empowered to act on behalf of, and at the scale of, the resource
being managed. There is a continued role for national sovereigns
and international law, to be sure. But their role is no longer to
claim exclusive authority; it is to authorize and empower new
transboundary institutions, and to legitimize their actions with the
mantle of legality.
The recently adopted Great Lakes Water Resource Compact
and Sustainable Water Resources Agreement on water allocation
hint at the institutional possibilities in the Great Lakes Basin.
These instruments are aimed at the rather modest goal of limiting
86
out-of-basin diversions of water from the Great Lakes Basin. More
specifically, the legally binding Compact among the eight Great
Lakes Basin states, and its mirror-image companion document, the
good-faith Agreement between the same eight states and two
Canadian provinces, provide for:
87
 A ban on new out-of-basin diversions, subject to narrowly
19 (2007) (describing requirements of the EU Water Framework Directive and
stating that the states have designated the International Commission for the
Protection of the Danube River as the “competent authority for overseeing the
implementation of the Directive”).
84. Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic
Sea Area, supra note 64.
85. Convention on Cooperation for the Protection and Sustainable Use of
the Danube River, June 29, 1994 (entered into force Oct. 22, 1998), available at
http://www.icpdr.org/main/icpdr/danube-river-protection-convention.
86. See A. Dan Tarlock, The International Joint Commission and Great Lakes
Diversions: Indirectly Extending the Reach of the Boundary Waters Treaty, 54 WAYNE L.
REV. 1671, 1673 (2008) (stating that the Compact, which makes it difficult to
divert water from the Great Lakes Basin, arose in reaction to “proposed or possible
projects to divert the Lakes’ water to the more arid regions of the United States or
undisclosed water-short countries”).
87. Compact, supra note 7, § 4.8; Agreement, supra note 8, art. 200(1).
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limited exceptions for “straddling” communities that are partly
within the basin and partly outside it and for certain intrabasin transfers (e.g., a diversion from the watershed of one
88
Great Lake to the watershed of another Great Lake).
Establishment of uniform regional standards for evaluating
and permitting proposed water withdrawals and consumptive
89
uses, including requirements that return flows shall be to the
90
source watershed, no individual or cumulative adverse
91
impacts on water quality or quantity shall be permitted, all
withdrawals and consumptive uses must be implemented so as
to incorporate environmentally sound and economically
92
feasible water conservation measures, and each permitted
withdrawal or consumptive use shall be “reasonable” as
determined by reference to a multi-factor balancing test set
93
out in the Compact and Agreement.
Requirements that each state (and province) develop a
comprehensive water resources inventory and contribute to a
94
common database on water resources and withdrawals, adopt
a state or provincial water management conservation and
95
efficiency plan and submit it for regional review, establish a
program to prohibit new diversions and regulate water
withdrawals and consumptive uses in accordance with basin96
wide standards set forth in the Compact and Agreement, and
report at five-year intervals on how the Compact and
Agreement are being implemented in each respective
97
jurisdiction.
Establishment of a regional governing body called the Great
Lakes Water Resources Council, consisting of the governors of
98
each of the states (or their representatives), and a parallel

88. Compact, supra note 7, § 4.9(1)–(2); Agreement, supra note 8, art. 201.
89. Compact, supra note 7, §§ 4.10–.11; Agreement, supra note 8, art. 203,
206.
90. Compact, supra note 7, § 4.11(1); Agreement, supra note 8, art. 203(1).
91. Compact, supra note 7, § 4.11(2); Agreement, supra note 8, art. 203(2).
92. Compact, supra note 7, § 4.11(3); Agreement, supra note 8, art. 203(3).
93. Compact, supra note 7, § 4.11(5); Agreement, supra note 8, art. 203(5).
94. Compact, supra note 7, § 4.1; Agreement, supra note 8, art. 301.
95. Compact, supra note 7, § 4.2(2); Agreement, supra note 8, art. 304.
96. Compact, supra note 7, §§ 4.3(1), 4.10; Agreement, supra note 8, art. 200,
206.
97. Compact, supra note 7, § 3.4(1); Agreement, supra note 8, art. 300.
98. See Compact, supra note 7, § 2.1 (establishing the Great Lakes-St.
Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Council).
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body called the Regional Body, consisting of the governors
99
The Council and
and the premiers of the two provinces.
Regional Body are to meet concurrently and are empowered
to develop guidance and promulgate and enforce basin-wide
100
regulations, to develop and implement region-wide water
101
management conservation and efficiency plans, to review the
water management plans and implementation reports of the
102
basin states and provinces, to make recommendations to the
states and provinces regarding implementation of the
103
Compact and Agreement, and to exercise “regional review”
permitting authority over proposed withdrawals or diversions
deemed to be of region-wide significance or of precedent104
setting character.
The Compact and Agreement apply not only to water within
the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River proper, but to all surface
105
water and groundwater within the basin.
In a controversial
compromise, the Compact and Agreement classify shipments of
water out of the basin in containers of 5.7 gallons or less as not
106
constituting “diversions.”
Also exempted is the longstanding
diversion at Chicago, which is governed by the United States
107
Supreme Court’s decree in Wisconsin v. Illinois.
Some critics within the Great Lakes Basin question whether
108
the instruments will be effective in achieving their stated goal.
99. See Agreement, supra note 8, art. 400 (establishing the Great Lakes-St.
Lawrence River Water Resources Regional Body).
100. See Compact, supra note 7, § 3.3 (empowering the Council to
“promulgate and enforce such rules and regulations as may be necessary for the
implementation and enforcement of this Compact”). In contrast, the Regional
Body is only given authority to “[d]evelop guidance for the implementation of the
Standard and the Exception Standard.” Agreement, supra note 8, art. 400(2)(i).
101. Compact, supra note 7, § 4.2(1); Agreement, supra note 8, art. 400(2)(f).
102. Compact, supra note 7, § 3.4(2); Agreement, supra note 8, art. 400(2)(c),
(e).
103. Compact, supra note 7, § 3.4(3); Agreement, supra note 8, art. 400(2)(h).
104. Compact, supra note 7, §§ 4.5(1), 4.5(5); Agreement, supra note 8, art.
400(2)(a)–(b), 500, 505.
105. Compact, supra note 7, §§ 1.2, 4.2(1); Agreement, supra note 8, art. 103,
304(1)(c).
106. Compact, supra note 7, § 4.12(10); Agreement, supra note 8, art. 207(9).
107. Compact, supra note 7, § 4.14; Agreement, supra note 8, art. 207(10)–
(14); see Wisconsin v. Illinois, 281 U.S. 696 (1930) (limiting diversion at the
Chicago Drainage Canal to an average of 1500 cubic feet per second after
December 31, 1938, and larger amounts during a transition period).
108. See Mark Squillace, Rethinking the Great Lakes Compact, 2006 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 1347, 1358–60 (arguing that the Compact focuses exclusively on new or
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Other critics question the goal itself, arguing that locking up twenty
percent of the world’s fresh surface water at a time of growing
water shortages and an uncertain water future in the age of global
109
climate change is a dubious undertaking.
Both critiques raise
important questions about the Compact and Agreement that are
beyond the scope of this article. Still others have suggested that the
Compact and Agreement were put forth as a solution to a remote
110
and speculative, or even non-existent, problem.
The focus here is not on the effectiveness of the Compact and
Agreement themselves, nor on the wisdom of what these
instruments are trying to achieve, but rather on what the Compact
and Agreement represent as a novel kind of transboundary
governance mechanism. They provide a model in which the states
and provinces did not wait for the national governments to act.
Nor did the states and provinces assume that because questions of
Great Lakes water allocation had a transboundary dimension,
decisions about their management properly fell within the
exclusive foreign affairs powers of their respective national
governments. Instead, the states and provinces seized the initiative
and crafted their own solution—a Compact among the eight states
that became legally binding by virtue of Congressional approval,
and a legally non-binding but morally compelling parallel goodfaith Agreement between the eight U.S. states and two provinces,
committing the two Canadian provinces to the exact same
provisions to which the U.S. states are legally bound by the
Compact and giving the provinces an equal seat at the table
alongside the states in the regional governing body created by the
instruments. The Compact and Agreement are then given further
legal and practical effect by legislative ratification in each state and
province, coupled with implementing legislation in each state and
increased withdrawals and diversions without addressing existing water uses in the
basin, which are much larger and more significant); Amanda Peterka,
“Jury Is Out” on Implementation of Landmark Great Lakes Compact, N.Y. TIMES, July 14,
2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/07/14/14greenwire-jury-is-out-on
-implementation-of-landmark-grea-33525.html
(describing
environmentalist
critiques of state implementation of the Compact).
109. See Squillace, supra note 108, at 1363–64 (questioning the ban on smallscale out-of-basin diversions that cause no perceptible harm to the Great Lakes but
may force out-of-basin communities in smaller watersheds to place greater
demands on already-stressed water resources).
110. See A. Dan Tarlock, Four Challenges for International Water Law, 23 TUL.
ENVTL. L.J. 369, 391 (2010) (stating that the Compact was a response to “remote or
trivially possible . . . transbasin diversion threats”).
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province to put the procedural and substantive commitments
called for in the Compact and Agreement into effect. Through this
ingenious device, the effect of the Compact and Agreement is to
create an actual transboundary governance regime, complete with
real transboundary decision-making institutions and backed by the
force of law in each of the states and provinces with a stake in the
resource, each harmonizing its domestic laws with the common
transboundary regulatory scheme.
That all this could take place without a sovereign-to-sovereign
international treaty specifically authorizing it might seem
remarkable. And so it is, but it gives us a sense of the possibilities.
These transboundary governance arrangements do not fit the
familiar contours of international law and international lawmaking.
Yet neither are they unlawful, nor completely extra-lawful. Indeed,
on the U.S. side at least, they come now with the formal blessing of
the federal government, in the form of congressional ratification of
the Compact and acquiescence by silence with respect to the
Agreement. It suggests there is space for more of this sort of thing.
A good thing, too, for when it comes to building effective
transboundary governance institutions in the Great Lakes Basin,
the initiative is not likely to come from Ottawa and Washington.
The initiative is more likely to come from within the Basin, where
the benefits of managing and protecting the Great Lakes are most
keenly felt. Formal sovereign ratification in the form of a new
international agreement, if needed, can come later.
III. THE LARGER SIGNIFICANCE OF THE GREAT LAKES COMPACT
AND AGREEMENT IN THE GREAT LAKES BASIN AND BEYOND
The Compact and Agreement represent an interesting and
novel model of transboundary governance of a natural system at a
scale tailored to the system itself, initiated and maintained by
subnational governments. Yet while the institutional arrangements
are bold and innovative in design, the purpose for which they are
established is exceedingly narrow in scope.
The Compact and Agreement also appear to operate wholly
apart from the efforts of the national governments of the United
States and Canada to manage the Great Lakes ecosystem through
the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement. As discussed in Part I,
the latest iteration of the GLWQA, like its predecessors, is long on
vision and ambition, but it suffers from a lack of appropriately
scaled institutional infrastructure. While the GLWQA anticipates
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state, local, and tribal participation in Great Lakes ecosystem
management, the role specified for these subnational actors is
confined to advising and consulting the national decision makers.
The example of the Compact and Agreement suggests not only that
it is possible to design transboundary institutions for decision
making at regional ecosystem scales, but that subnational
governments are capable of participating as true decision makers,
not just advisers. The next logical stage in the evolution of Great
Lakes ecosystem governance, then, is to design hybrid regionally
scaled institutions that include both federal and state/provincial
governments—as well as possibly others, such as local watershed
management agencies, tribes, and First Nations—as co-decision
makers, with the aim to integrate management of the entire suite
of resources and stressors that comprise the Great Lakes. Such an
arrangement would in effect merge the functions of the GLWQA
and the Compact and Agreement, and fuse the regional
institutional skeleton created by the Compact and Agreement with
the binational relationship and programmatic vision of the
GLWQA.
That sort of hybrid institutional mechanism is not likely to
evolve organically out of either the present GLWQA or the
Compact and Agreement. Indeed, it is difficult to see how the
national governments, operating through the GLWQA, could
negotiate the terms of any such new arrangement on behalf of
their respective subnational governments; and by the same token,
the states and provinces, working within the framework of the
Compact and Agreement, lack authority to negotiate on behalf of
their respective national governments. Yet over time the presence
of effective regionally scaled governance institutions created by the
Compact and Agreement could operate as both a model and as a
spur to policymakers at both the national, regional, and
state/provincial levels, inspiring them to explore governance
possibilities beyond the traditional and familiar arrangements that
to date have proven largely ineffective.
What broader lessons can be drawn from the Great Lakes
Compact and Agreement, beyond their implications for the Great
Lakes Basin itself? An obvious question is whether the governance
model established by the Compact and Agreement is replicable
outside the Great Lakes Basin. There certainly are other important
natural systems that straddle national boundaries, but at first blush
it would appear that the Compact and Agreement model can be
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effective only where all the relevant nations are federal systems. It
is not unusual for nations, especially large ones, to embrace some
form of federalism, but neither is federalism a universal practice,
and it is perhaps even rarer to find two federal systems operating
side by side, like the United States and Canada. Yet arguably it
would be a mistake to take the federalism requirement too
seriously. Most political systems, federal and non-federal, vest some
measure of decision-making autonomy in subnational
governmental authorities. The key fact about the Great Lakes
states and provinces is perhaps not that they are states and
provinces in federal systems, but that they are subnational
governments with interests in a shared transboundary resource and
have substantial authority over it. Wherever those conditions
obtain, some sort of transboundary governance mechanism at least
loosely resembling the arrangements created by the Compact and
Agreement is possible.
A final observation concerns the contrast between binding law,
on the one hand, and the moral force of a good-faith agreement,
on the other. Does it matter that the Compact among the eight
U.S. states is legally binding, while the transboundary Agreement
that brings in the two Canadian provinces is not? Certainly as a
formal matter it makes some difference. Although all eight states
have now ratified the Compact, all ten jurisdictions have embraced
the Agreement, and all have incorporated the requirements of the
111
Compact and Agreement into state or provincial legislation, it is,
in principle, easier for a party to withdraw from the Agreement
than from the Compact. The Agreement itself specifies that any
party may withdraw from the Agreement unilaterally upon written
notice; in that case, the Agreement remains in force with respect to
the remaining parties, unless terminated by written agreement of
all remaining parties. In contrast, the Compact purports to bind all
parties until the Compact is terminated by a majority vote of all
112
parties and provides for judicial review in the federal courts of
111. See id. at 391–92; see also GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE RIVER WATER RES.
REG’L BODY & GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE RIVER BASIN WATER RES. COUNCIL, JOINT
DECLARATION OF FINDING 4–5 (2010).
112. Compact, supra note 7, § 8.7. The default rule in the law of interstate
compacts is that no party may renounce an interstate compact without the
unanimous consent of all parties, absent a provision to the contrary in the
compact itself. See Herbert H. Naujoks, Compacts and Agreements Between States and
Between States and a Foreign Power, 36 MARQ. L. REV. 219, 227 (1952–53). Generally,
termination of a compact also requires unanimous consent of all parties, but
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actions taken under the Compact, stating that the court may
113
provide equitable relief or (unspecified) “civil penalties.”
Ultimately, however, it is probably not the threat of judicial
enforcement but the good faith of the parties that will determine
whether the Compact is effective; it is hard to imagine what judicial
remedies would compel a recalcitrant state that no longer wanted
to be part of the Compact to carry out its affirmative duties under
that agreement effectively. If that is the case, then the “legally
binding” character of the Compact may be something of a mirage.
Nor is it likely that the Compact regime could withstand persistent
and substantial non-compliance by one or more parties. To that
extent, the success of the Compact, like that of the Agreement, is
likely to turn more on the good faith of the parties than on the
threat of legal enforcement.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Great Lakes-Saint Lawrence River Basin Water Resources
Compact and Great Lakes-Saint Lawrence River Basin Sustainable
Water Resources Agreement represent, on one level, a rather
modest step toward the development of institutions for
transboundary ecosystem governance in the Great Lakes Basin—
modest because those instruments are narrowly crafted to achieve
the limited objective of keeping water in the Basin. Their
significance lies in the fact that they create a new kind of
institutional architecture for management of Basin resources,
creating cooperation and policy harmonization across all ten Basin
states and provinces, and establishing transboundary regional
institutions with real decision-making authority, operating at a
Basin-wide scale. In so doing, they demonstrate both that it is

because the Great Lakes Water Resources Compact provides for termination by
majority vote, that is the operative rule. The default rule in international treaty
law provides somewhat more liberal opt-out terms: under Article 60 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, a non-breaching party may unilaterally
terminate or suspend its treaty obligations upon material breach by another party,
and under Article 62 a party may terminate in the event of a “fundamental change
of circumstances” if it “radically . . . transform[s] the extent of obligations still to
be performed under the treaty.” See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
113. Compact, supra note 7, § 7.3.2.a. Presumably, a suit by one or more states
to compel another state’s compliance with the Compact would fall within the
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States. See U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 2.
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possible to devise transboundary governance arrangements for
management of a natural system and that it is possible to generate
transboundary normativity without international law.
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